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Iraq
The Soviet Union
When the Baath Party came to power in 1968, relations between
Iraq and the West were strained. The Baathists believed that most
Western countries, and particularly the United States, opposed
the goal of Arab unity. The Baathists viewed the 1948 partition
of Palestine and the creation of Israel as evidence of an imperialist
plot to keep the Arabs divided. Refusal to recognize Israel and
support for the reestablishment of Palestine consequently became
central tenets of Baath ideology. The party based Iraq's relations
with other countries on those countries' attitudes toward the
Palestinian issue. The Soviet Union, which had supported the Arabs
during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War and again during the October
1973 Arab-Israeli War, was regarded as having an acceptable position
on the Palestine issue. Thus, the Baath cultivated relations with
Moscow to counter the perceived hostility of the United States.
In 1972 the Baathist regime signed a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Article 1 stated that the treaty's
objective was to develop broad cooperation between Iraq and the
Soviet Union in economic, trade, scientific, technical, and other
fields on the basis of "respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity
and non-interference in one another's internal affairs." Under
the treaty, Iraq obtained extensive technical assistance and military
equipment from the Soviet Union.
Despite the importance that both the Bakr and the Saddam Husayn
governments attached to the relationship with the Soviet Union,
they were reluctant to have Iraq become too closely entangled
with the Soviet Union or with its sphere of influence. Ideologically,
the Baath Party espoused nonalignment vis-a-vis the superpower
rivalry, and the party perceived Iraq as being part of the Nonaligned
Movement. Indeed, as early as 1974, the more pragmatic elements
in the party advocated broadening relations with the West to counterbalance
those with the East and to ensure that Iraq maintained a genuine
nonaligned status. The dramatic increase in oil revenues following
the December 1973 quadrupling of prices by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) provided the government with
the financial resources to expand economic relations with numerous
private and public enterprises in Western Europe, Japan, and the
United States. Iraq also was able to diversify its source of weapons
by purchasing arms from France.
The major impetus for Iraq's retreat from its close relationship
with the Soviet Union was not economic, despite Iraq's increasing
commercial ties with the West, but political. Iraqis were shocked
by the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Saddam
Husayn's government took a lead among the Arab states in condemning
the invasion. Additional strain was placed on Iraqi-Soviet relations
in the fall of 1980, when the Soviet Union cut off arms shipments
to Iraq (and to Iran) as part of its efforts to induce a cease-fire.
This action angered Saddam Husayn and his colleagues, because
Iraq had already paid more than US$1 billion dollars for the interdicted
weapons. Although Moscow resumed arms supplies to Iraq in the
summer of 1982, following the Iranian advance into Iraqi territory,
Iraqi leaders remained bitter over the initial halt.
Despite Iraq's apparent ambivalence about its relationship with
the Soviet Union, in early 1988 relations remained correct. The
Soviets were still the main source of weapons for the Iraqi military,
a fact that restrained public criticism. Nevertheless, the Saddam
Husayn government generally suspected that the Soviet Union was
more interested in gaining influence in Iran than in preserving
its friendship with Iraq. Consequently, Iraqi leaders were skeptical
of Soviet declarations that Moscow was trying to persuade Iran
to agree to a cease-fire. They expressed disappointment in late
1987 that the Soviet Union had not exerted sufficient pressure
upon Iran to force it to cooperate with the UN Security Council
cease-fire resolution of July 1987.
Data as of May 1988
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