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Israel
The Orthodox-Secular Cleavage
As has been seen,
Israeli Judaism in the late 1980s exerted its influence on society
through a complex interplay of ethnicity, halakah, and political
and ideological ferment--as well as through the notions of Israeli
Jewish citizenship, nationality, security, and sovereignty. In
part because of the institutionalization of the status quo arrangements
of the late 1940s and early 1950s, in part because of the disproportionate
power available to small (religious) political parties in the
Israeli parliamentary system, traditional Judaism both pervades
and structures much of everyday life (see Multiparty System ,
ch. 4). Because many of the Orthodox of various persuasions view
the status quo as the baseline from which to advance, they are
accused by many secular Israelis of trying to impose additional
cultural controls and religious structures. As an example of Orthodox
pressures, when Begin formed his first coalition government in
1977, the religious parties took advantage of this change in the
political status quo to push for changes in the religious status
quo as well. Thirty-five of the forty-three clauses in the 1977
multiparty coalition agreement submitted to the Knesset dealt
with religious questions.
Since the early 1970s, neo-Orthodox youths have been more assertive
and less defensive in their religious observance--a charge leveled
against their elders in the 1950s and 1960s. The "knitted skullcap
generation" of the post-June 1967 War era has in some ways replaced
the Labor Zionist kibbutzniks of a former era as the pioneering
vanguard of Israeli society. Meanwhile, the ultra-Orthodox in
1988 were as willing as ever to challenge secular authorities,
on the streets and with violence if need be, to protect their
prerogatives and to preserve the special character of their enclave
communities.
The results of these trends have been twofold: a growing traditionalization
of Israeli society in terms of religion, and the sharpening of
conflict between the extremist Orthodox and their sympathizers
and the secularists who oppose the Orthodox Jews and their agendas.
Despite the sharp rift, a sort of modus vivendi has emerged, which
is what the status quo agreements intended. But the status quo
itself has not been stable or stagnant; on the contrary it has
been dynamic, gradually shifting toward religion.
Data as of December 1988
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